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Sufficient conditions for the existence of subgame-perfect 
equilibria in a class of two-stage "entry games" are provided. In this 
class of games, players first decide to enter (participate) or not, and 
then play a non-cooperative game with a unique equilibrium in the 
second stage. The assumptions used do not exclude asymmetry of the 
players. The result is applicable to asymmetric oligopoly models with 























































































































































































We consider here a class of non-cooperative two-stage games, with a 
finite set of players. In the first stage, players decide to "enter" or to 
"remain outside". In the second stage, those players who decided to 
enter play a game whose non-cooperative equilibrium is assumed to be 
unique. The payoff of the players who decided not to participate in 
the second stage game is equal to zero. An equilibrium or "stable" 
configuration is defined as a subset of the initial set of players such 
that: (i) each player in the subset enters, chooses a non-cooperative 
equilibrium strategy, and receives a non-negative payoff, (ii) all 
players who remain outside would receive a negative payoff if they 
decided to enter and join the subset of "active" players.
Sufficient conditions for the existence of "stable" configurations 
are provided. These conditions restrict the structure of equilibrium 
payoffs in an interesting an intuitive manner, but they do not relie on 
symmetry assumptions.
The result is clearly applicable to asymmetric oligopolistic market 
models in which participating firms must take a preliminary entry 
decision and then compete in a second stage. It also sheds some light 
on the more general problem of market equilibrium under 
(technological) non-convexities, such as the presence of (large and 
asymmetric) fixed costs.
Finally, this existence result is a generalization of a theorem 
proved by Selten and Giith (1982).
1. A class of games
1.1. Description of the two-stage game
Let J(n)={ 1 ,...n} denote the set of players or firms, indexed by j. Let 
P(n) denote the set of all subsets of J(n).
In the first stage, each firm j decides to enter or not. Firm j's 




























































































strategies are assumed to be unique.
1.2. Stable configurations
For all j, firm j's equilibrium payoff is defined as a function Kj : P(n) 
-> R. This must be interpreted as follows. For every subset A e P(n), 
Ttj(A) is firm j's equilibrium payoff when the firms k e A have 
decided to enter. If j s  J(n)\A, then 7Cj( A) = 0.
Definition: A subset A* included in P(n) is an equilibrium  
configuration (or is a "stable" configuration) if and only if:
(1) A*= J(n) and Jtj(J(n)) > 0 for all j € J(n). 
or (2) A*= 0  and 7tj({j}) < 0 for all j e J(n). 
or (3) J(n) 3  A*, rtj(A*) > 0 for all j e A*, and 7tk(A * u  {k}) < 0 
for a l ik e  J(n) \  A*.
The problem can now be formulated: under which conditions does 
a "stable" configuration A* exist?
1.3. Monotonicity of payoff functions
1.3.1. Counterexample with n=2
In the case of 2 firms, let equilibrium payoffs be defined as follows:
*i({ l})>0; rc1({l»2}) < 0;
7C2({2}) < 0; tc2({1,2}) > 0.
It is clear that for all A e P(2), A is unstable. Firm 2 wishes to 
enter when firm 1 is already operating on the market, but when firm 2 
enters, firm 1 makes losses, and firm 2 does not want to stay alone on 































































































For all A e P(n), all j e A, itj(A) > ic /A u fk }) for all k e J(n) \  A.
In example 1.3.1, one has 7t2({2}) < 0 and 7^(11,2}) > 0, so that 
assumption H(l) is violated.
1.4. Acyclicity of dominance relations
Assumption H (l) is not sufficient to ensure the existence of a stable 
configuration, as shown by the following example with three firms.
1.4.1. Counterexample with n=3
i t i ( l U l ) < 0;
tci({1}) > 0; «2(11,2}) >0; 71,(11,2,3}) < 0 :
tc2({2}) > 0; « 2({2 ,3 } ) <0; «2(11,2 ,3}) < 0 ;
7C3({3 } )  > 0; « 3({2 ,3 } ) >0; 7t3({ 1,2,3}) < 0 ;
« i({1,3}> > 0;
«3(11 .3}) < 0.
In this example, there is clearly no stable configuration with either 
0 firms, or with 3 firms. In addition, if firm i is on the market, firm j 
wishes to enter and i makes losses. Therefore, there is no stable 
configuration either with a single firm or with two firms operating on 
the market.
1.4.2. 'Dominance' relation among firms
Definition : Define the binary relation >° as follows. Let i, j be two 
different firms in J(n). By definition, i >° j if and only if there exists a 
subset S 3  {i, j } such that u^S) > 0 and 7tj(S) < 0. In the above 
example 1.4.1, there is a cycle
1 >° 3 >° 2 > °  1,
and the example satisfies the monotonicity requirement H (l). 
Considering all pairs {i, j } in 1.4.1, it is sufficient to reverse just one 




























































































suppress the cycle and a stable set A with either one or two elements 





2. Existence of stable configurations
Lemma: Under assumptions H (l) and H(2), there exists a stable 
configuration for all n.
2.1. Proof of the Lemma
Clearly, a stable set exists for n=l (and n=2) under H (l) and H(2). 
The result is proved by induction over n.
Step 1. Suppose that the Lemma holds true for n and suppose that 
a stable set does not exist under H (l) and H(2) in a game with n+1 
firms. Define J(-k) = J(n+l)\{k} for all ke { l , . . . ,n + l }. The 
restrictions of the functions (jtj) to J(-k) and its subsets constitute a 
well-defined sub-problem (a game with only n players). If H (l) and 
H(2) hold in the game with n+1 players, they are clearly also satisfied 
in the restricted game with J(-k) as a set of players. Hence, by the 
induction hypothesis, for all k e J(n+1), there exists a "stable" 
configuration, denoted A(-k), in the sub-problem defined by J(-k) and 
the corresponding restrictions of the functions (jtj).
Since there is no stable set in the complete game with n+1 players, 
firm k necessarily wishes to enter and "join" A(-k) for all k e J(n+1). 
Formally, for all k e J(n+1), one must have Jtk(A(-k) u  {k}) > 0, for 
otherwise, A(-k) would be a stable set in J(n+1), since ttj(A(-k)) > 0 
for all j e A(-k) and 7ti(A(-k) u  {i}) < 0 for all i e J(-k) \  A(-k).
Step 2. Furthermore, each "outsider" k dominates an element of 
A(-k). To show this, suppose that it is not true. Then, for all j e 




























































































jti(A(-k) u  (k) u  {i}) < 0, 
since by H (l), one necessarily has
iti(A(-k) u  {k} u  {i}) < Jti(A(-k) u  {i}) < 0 
for all i e J(-k) \  A(-k). But if these inequalities were true, they 
would implie that A(-k)u{k} is a stable configuration in the complete 
problem with n+1 players, which contradicts the assumption that a 
stable set doesn't exist.
Step 3. Thus, if a stable configuration does not exist in the 
complete game (in J(n+1)), for all k e J(n+1), there exists jk ^ k such 
that k >° jk, with jk e J(-k).
The elements of J(n+1) can thus be relabeled to provide 
j i> °  j2>°...>° jk>°...>° jn+1.
But it has been shown that there exists jn+2 e J(n+1) such that 
J n + l^  Jn+2-
Therefore, there must be a cycle, and H(2) is violated. This 
contradicts the assumption that a stable set does not exist in the 
complete game. Q.E.D.
2.2 H (l) and H(2) are not necessary for the existence o f an 
equilibrium configuration.
By means of a couple of examples, it is easy to show that the sufficient 
conditions H (l) and H(2) are not necessary conditions.
2.2.1. Monotonicity is not necessary
Let n = 3, and consider the equilibrium payoff functions defined as 
follows.
7ti({U}) > 0;
7t1( { l } ) < 0 ;  tc2({1,2}) > 0; ^ ({1 ,2 ,3}) > 0; 
ti2({2 } )< 0 ;  ^ ({2 ,3 }) >0; ^ ({1 ,2 ,3}) > 0;
7C3( { 3}) < 0; tc3({2,3}) > 0; tc3({ 1,2,3}) > 0;
* t ( { l ,3 } ) > 0 ;
ic3( { 1 ,3 } )> 0 .




























































































2.2.2. Acyclicity is not necessary
Let n = 4, and consider the payoff functions defined as follows.
tci( { 1 , 2 } ) > 0 ;
tci( { 1 } ) > 0 ;  7t2( { l , 2 } ) < 0 ; * i ( { i , j , k } )  <  0; and
jc2( { 2 } ) > 0 ;  7 U 2({2 ,3 })> 0 ; 7 t j( { i, j,k } )  <  0; 7ti(J(4)) <  0;
tc3( { 3 } )  >  0; jc3( { 2 , 3 ) ) < 0 ; * k ( { i j> k } )  <  0; fo r  a ll i  e J(4).
tc4({4 }>  >  0; tc3( {3 ,4 } )  >  0; fo r  a ll
tc4( {3 ,4 } )  <  0; { i , j ,k }e  P(4);
tci({1 ,3 }>  >  0;
7t3( { l , 3 } )  <  0; 
* , ( { 1 ,4 } )  <  0; 
* 4({  1 ,4 }) <  0;
* 2 ( (2 ,4 } )  <  0;
7t4( {2 ,4 } )  >  0;
In this last example, acyclicity is violated: one finds 2 >° 3 >° 4 >°
2, but A*={ 1} is a stable set. Note that monotonicity is satisfied.
3. Applications
The above result is clearly applicable to some asymmetric oligopolistic 
market models with a preliminary entry decision of firms.
For instance, consider a Cournot oligopoly model such that firms 
face the same demand function and have the same variable costs, but 
such that fixed costs are different across firms. One then easily finds 
that the dominance relation is complete and transitive. Firm i 
dominates firm j if and only if firm i's fixed cost is strictly lower than 
firm j's fixed cost. In this type of model, the monotonicity assumption 
introduced above is also satisfied under standard assumptions 
(downward sloping demand), and the existence of an equilibrium 
configuration of the market is guaranteed.
The loose structure of the second stage game studied above permits 
one to consider a much wider class of situations. It is sufficient to 




























































































possible subgame (or each possible subset of participating players). 
For instance, the result could be useful to study the existence of 
equilibria in general equilibrium models with imperfect competition 
and production sets of the type {0} u K , 0 «  K, K convex and compact 
(see Novshek and Sonnenschein (1986)). Assumptions H (l) and H(2), 
although intuitively reasonable, might induce overly strong restrictions 
on the underlying economic data of the model considered. It remains 
to be shown that sufficiently general and interesting economic 
situations lead to a payoff structure satisfying the above introduced 
monotonicity and acyclicity requirements.
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